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Abstract
This paper is a multidisciplinary study of two competing theories of states’ motives and
behavior in international relations, realism and transnationalism. The first theory, realism,
suggests that states are constantly competing for security and power within an anarchical
international system incapable of preventing aggression or conflict. A competing philosophy,
transnationalism, (also known as liberalism) suggests that cooperation, not competition, is the
defining characteristic of international relations and that democratization and global economic
interdependence reduce the benefits of interstate conflict and encourage long-term cooperation.
This paper seeks to explain the apparent disparity of states competing for power in security
matters while also acting cooperatively in international trade and finance. Using the war in Iraq,
the growth of global economic interdependence, and the increasing legalism of international trade
as examples of state behavior, this paper concludes that realism and transnationalism are not
mutually exclusive. Increasing divisions between daily diplomatic and economic transactions and
less frequent military-security issues allows states to behave in an orderly fashion in some
dealings and compete for power and security in others. While Louis Henkin’s dictum that most
states obey international law much of the time appears to hold true, the minority of instances
where states do not comply involve the most sensitive of national security issues—such as
response to external threats, territory, access to resources, and weapons proliferation.
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I: Introduction
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world…”
--Preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights1
“The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel...the strong do what they
have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”
-- Thucydides, The Melian Dialogue, 431 BC2
Scholars, lawyers, and diplomats have long debated the motives behind state behavior.
Despite years of analysis, debate, and study, no single comprehensive theory has emerged to
explain why some states opt to compete rather than cooperate, while others rely on the rule of law
over force of arms. Of particular debate is the role and function of international laws and
structures in influencing state behavior. While within the law many take for granted that
international law is binding upon states,3 in other fields of study there has long been great debate
on how or whether international norms, laws, and institutions shape state action, and to what
degree compliance with their terms is due to a genuine sense of legal or moral obligation or
actually is the result of a selfish pursuit of national interests.
This paper seeks to examine two competing theories of states’ motives and behavior in
international relations, realism and transnationalism.4 The first, realism, has been the dominant
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
2
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 402 (Rex Warner, trans., 1972).
3
See generally Thomas M. Franck, Centennial Essay: The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of
Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 A.J.I.L. 88, 89 (2006).
4
While this paper seeks to present two competing theories of international relations, as with any
generalization of human behavior within a social system, the described schools of thought are not intended
to present universal or exclusive theories of state behavior or foreign relations. Different scholars and
advocates often vary in their description of each school of thought, while others combine elements of
different theories to develop other doctrines not described here. See JACK DONNELLY, REALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 131 (2000), noting that any two theoretical approaches to international
relations are ‘competing’ only in the sense that they focus on different forces and thus may provide better
or worse insights into particular cases. See also Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two
Approaches, in INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 187 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996), noting that “deterministic laws elude us, since we are
studying the purposive behavior of relatively small numbers of actors engaged in strategic bargaining...we
must understand that we can aspire only to formulate conditional, context-specific generalizations rather
than to discover universal laws, and that our understanding of world politics will always be incomplete.”
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doctrine in international relations theory since the end of the Second World War.5 States, realism
suggests, are constantly competing for security and power within an anarchical international
system incapable of preventing aggression or conflict. Because every state maintains an
offensive capacity to harm others, each must gain and retain power at any cost or risk predation
by aggressors. Realism is pessimistic about the likelihood of long-term cooperation, as
competition for security between states is a zero-sum game, with advances on the part of one state
inherently threatening to the security of others. International law and international institutions
sometimes dictate courses of action that run parallel with states’ interest, realists suggest, but
compliance is quickly discarded when international law requires behavior that is to their
detriment. In the absence of centralized enforcement or adjudication of international law, realists
argue, the international system remains anarchical, with law reduced to empty legalisms used to
justify the pursuit of national ends.
A competing philosophy, transnationalism, (also known as liberalism)6 offers a dramatically
different vision of international relations. Transnationalism suggests that cooperation, not
competition, is the defining characteristic of international relations and that democratization and
global economic interdependence reduce the benefits of interstate conflict and encourage longterm cooperation. Transnationalists assert that states have binding legal obligations under
international law, and those rules are gradually developing into a rule-based ‘community’ capable
of regulating the behavior of states. Through a framework of international laws, norms, and
regimes, transnationalists argue, the sovereignty of the state is slowly yielding to international
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Richard H. Steinberg and Jonathan M. Zasloff, Centennial Essay: Power and International Law, 100
A.J.I.L. 64, 73 (2006).
6
Transnationalism, as it is used in this paper, does not claim to be a new theory of international relations
but rather a synthesis of a number of theories and doctrines in both international relations and international
law. It includes major elements from liberalism and neoliberalism, but also regime theory, cosmopolitan
theory, and functional institutionalism. While the author’s conception of transnationalism is generally
equivalent to liberalism, the author believes the term ‘transnationalism’ is more descriptive and avoids any
suggested linkage to a particular political affiliation.
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legal norms that lessen the likelihood of conflict, facilitate interstate cooperation, and promote
universal human values such as justice, human rights, and international equity.
This paper seeks to determine if these two competing philosophies can be reconciled,
particularly in reference to national security. At first glance, they have little in common. One is
pessimistic about the likelihood of long-term international stability and suggests that competition
and war might be an inevitable ‘state of nature.’ 7 The other is optimistic and normative,
encouraging inter-state cooperation as a means towards a Wilsonian vision of what the
international system should and could be. The two doctrines sharply disagree on most
fundamental issues, including the structural nature of the international system, the duty to comply
with of international law, the transparency of states’ motives, the role of force and morality in
international relations, and the likelihood of cooperation.
A close review of transnationalism and realism suggests that in fact there is theoretical room
for both. A lack of clarity in the historical record on states’ motives and frequent coincidences of
interest between states’ self-interest and respect for international law means that states’ behavior
can be interpreted either as realist competition or internationalist cooperation, depending on the
observer’s point of view. For example, states routinely obey their treaty obligations, comply with
fundamental international norms, and cooperate with other nations within the framework of
international regimes such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or United Nations (UN).
Realists argue that this adherence is due to states’ perceptions of the greatest benefit to be had, as
weaker states desire orderly and predictable international relations that might lessen their chance
of being victimized, while more powerful nations have a vested interest in preserving a status quo
from which they benefit. In contrast, transnationalists counter that states comply with these
largely unenforceable rules because they perceive them to be legitimate, have consented to be
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JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 17 (2001). “Realism tends to
emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and
to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to these forces and these
tendencies.”
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bound, and because they believe in the body of a larger body politic to which they are obligated.
Additionally, the normative nature of transnationalism allows proponents to argue that even if
states are still primarily motivated by a pursuit of their national interests, a sense of legal
obligation to international norms and laws strengthens as compliance becomes habitual.
Where realism and transnationalism are far less reconcilable, however, are in matters
perceived to be critical to national defense or survival. If, as Louis Henkin once famously
suggested, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all
their obligations all of the time,”8 the minority of instances where states do not comply involve
the most sensitive of national security issues—such as response to external threats, territory,
access to resources, and weapons proliferation. States generally do not subordinate their interests
to an international ‘common good’ when the result is detrimental to their national security, and in
such cases they are more likely to disregard international norms in order to defend or pursue
interests they perceive as vital.
The general unwillingness of states to compromise and cooperate on national security issues
does not preclude them from cooperating in other fields, however. There is considerable
evidence of states’ increasing willingness to be bound by international laws and norms in the
fields of international trade, finance, and investment even while they compete for power and
security. As global commerce and interdependence has increased in recent decades, many states
have entered into bilateral or multilateral economic arrangements that have limited their policy
options, while international institutions are now managing economic issues that were previously
the sole domain of the state. As the pace of globalization has rapidly accelerated in recent years,
a number of observers have commented on the growing disconnect between international
economic-political and military-security issues, with states frequently complying with
international law in the former even if they are unwilling to cede to the will of others on the latter.
While scholars disagree on the reasons behind this split, the international system appears to be
8

LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2nd ed. 1979 ).
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increasingly bifurcated, with economic-financial dealings regulated by international law and
international rules on military-security issues of diminishing relevance.
In order to determine whether and how realism and transnationalism might be reconcilable in
international relations, this paper will first examine the doctrines of realism and transnationalism
in order to define their basic philosophical tenets. Part III will compare and contrast the two
doctrines on their major points of disagreement, including the structure of the international
system, compliance with international law, the likelihood of cooperation, international morality,
and the utility of the use of force in international relations. Part IV will examine the international
justification for the war in Iraq as a practical case study of tension between perceived security
interests and international norms and law, and contrast those developments with the increased
legalization of international commerce and financial matters. Finally, the conclusion will
summarize the findings of this paper and examine how transnationalism and realism might be
viewed as not mutually exclusive.
II: What Is Realism?
Realism suggests that the national interest, rather than legal rules, drives foreign policy, and
that power relationships rather than legal institutions, are the ultimate determinants of state
behavior.9 This doctrine is based on five major premises. First, states are the primary actors in
international affairs, and each state’s survival depends primarily on its own efforts to maintain its
security. Secondly, due to the anarchical nature of the international system, states are
preoccupied with power and security and are predisposed to compete, rather than cooperate, for
power and resources. Thirdly, states are egoistic, rational actors who seek to maximize their

9

INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 94
(Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL RULES]. A focus on anarchical nature of the
international system is characteristic of the neorealist (also known as defensive or structural realism) school
of thought, as defined by Kenneth Waltz and others. Alternate definitions of classical, or offensive realism,
insist it is not the nature of the international system, but rather man’s “will to power” that pushes states to
strive for supremacy. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 19. For a legal examination of variations on
realism, see also Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 5, at 73-76.
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power and fourth, are sensitive to relative erosions of their position and capabilities in relation to
other nations. Finally, realism states that international laws and organizations do little to affect
the overall likelihood of cooperation.10
First, realism holds that states are the major actors in international relations. There is no
authority or sovereignty above the level of the state—no “government over governments,”11—and
state sovereignty allows each nation to pursue their own objectives and interests independent of
the welfare of others.12 Under realism, the state, as noted by Charles De Visscher, a former
President of the International Court of Justice, is “an end in itself, is free of any moral rein; it
seeks unlimited power and answers to no one for what it does.”13
Secondly, the international system is anarchical, lacking a central authority capable of
preventing the use of force. Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them,14 and states
who do not protect their security or vital interests risks victimization by aggressors.15 Every state
has the offensive capability to harm or destroy others,16 and accordingly states can never be
certain of the intentions of others.17 As stated by Kenneth Waltz, “In the absence of a supreme
authority, there is then constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force.”18 The
intentions of other states can rapidly change from benign to hostile, so while alliances do occur,
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Joseph M. Greico, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionism, in INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 147 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996).
11
See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 30.
12
See generally JOSEPH S. NYE JR, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER 155 (2002). The 1648 Treaty of
Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War and marked the formal recognition of states as sovereign,
independent political units, “confirm[ing] the plural and secular system of a society of independent states.”
See CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6, 204 (P.E. Corbett trans.,
1968); CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES FOR GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 21 (2005).
13
DE VISSCHER, supra note 12, at 8.
14
See KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 205 (1959). “In
international politics there is no authority effectively able to prohibit the use of force.”
15
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 32-33.
16
Id. at 30.
17
Id. at 31.
18
WALTZ, supra note at 14, at 188. See also id. at 159. “With many sovereign states, with no system of
law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates
of its own reason or desire—conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur.”
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states cannot assume the loyalties of their allies.19 Faced with potential adversaries on all sides
and unable to depend on others to guarantee their continued existence, each state’s survival
depends solely on its own efforts to preserve its security.20
Third, states are preoccupied with power and security, and predisposed towards conflict and
competition.21 International politics is a “ruthless and dangerous business,” and states work to
guarantee their survival by using all the means at their disposal to obtain power.22 Power is the
means by which states guarantee their continued existence, “the ability to affect the outcomes you
want, and to change the behavior of others to make this happen.”23 The stronger a state is relative
to its potential rivals, the less likely it will be attacked, or its survival threatened.24 Accordingly,
each state attempts to maximize its power, either absolutely or in relation to neighbors and rivals.
As this usually comes at the expense of other states, each is constantly looking to either gain an
advantage or prevent others from gaining an advantage over them.25 Accordingly, interstate
security competition is constant, with little likelihood of long-term tranquility.26 When
international peace or stability occurs, it is the result of a balance of power—a parity in strength

19

MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 31. See also Greico, supra note 1010, at 148; “According to realists,
states worry that today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy in war.” Quoting Robert Jervis, Greico explains
how states can turn on former allies if the opportunity presents itself: “Minds can be changed, new leaders
can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise.” Id. at 156.
20
Stephen A. Kocs, Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States: International Law as System Structure, 38
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 4, 535, 536 (1996). See also MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 33.
21
Id. at 33. See also DE VISSCHER, supra note 12, at 22. “Between states equally imbued with their
sovereign prerogatives, competition became the law of international relations.”
22
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 2, 35.
23
NYE, supra note 12, at 4.
24
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 33.
25
See generally id. at 2. See also Frederick L. Schuman, International Ideals and the National Interest,
280 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 27, 29 (1952). “It is
therefore the obligation of every statesman to pursue power rather than virtue. Under anarchy the virtuous
who lack power succumb, while the powerful who lack virtue often survive.” According to realists, the
zero-sum nature of states’ competition for power leads to the ‘security dilemma,’ where one states’
acquisition of power is inherently threatening to others. “Striving to attain security from…attack, [states]
are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This in
turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel
entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensures, and the vicious circle of
security and power accumulation is on.” MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 36.
26
Id. at 33.
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between nations who have banded together to protect themselves from aggressors or to prevent
one nation from imposing its will upon the rest.27
Fourth, states are rational egoists who are “sensitive to costs,” determining their actions on
assessments of their own welfare and not that of others.28 They are aware of their environment
and think strategically about how to survive and prosper in it in relation to other states.29 As
stated by Kenneth Waltz, “So long as the notion of self-help [in the use of force] persists, the aim
of maintaining the power position of the nation is paramount to all other considerations.”30 States
are acutely aware of erosions in their relative capabilities, which they rely upon to maintain their
security and independence in a system often prone to violence.31 They do not subordinate their
interests to those of other states or the international community,32 and pursue other goals—such
as economic well being—only so long as they do not interfere with their security interests.33
Finally, realists assert that international norms and institutions only marginally affect the
prospects for cooperation. In their constant competition for power and security, states often fail
to cooperate even when they have common interests. Where states do enter into cooperative
agreements, fears of cheating and exploitation limit their ability to fully commit. Each participant
measures its gains in comparison to those of its partners to insure that the other is not benefiting
27

Realists believe that international stability—which does not necessarily equate to a lack of conflict—is
most likely when one or more opposing blocs of states have achieved a rough parity in power through
temporary alliances, preventing any single nation from enforcing his will upon the rest. See generally
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 197 (4th ed.
1967). “The metaphor of two scales kept in balance by an equal distribution of weights on either side,
providing the mechanism for the maintenance of stability and order on the international scene, has its origin
in…mechanistic philosophy. It was applied to the practical affairs of international politics in the spirit of
that philosophy.” See also Charles W. Kegley Jr., The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World
Politics: An Introduction, in CONTROVERSIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM AND THE
NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE 5 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1995), discussing mechanisms for states to balance
power. In a strategy known as ‘balancing,’ states may band together to offer mutual protection against a
rival state or groups of states. Alternatively, states may also ‘bandwagon,’ allying with a rising power in
order to improve their odds of survival.
28
ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL
ECONOMY 66 (2005).
29
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 31.
30
WALTZ, supra note 14, at 160. “The first concern of states is to maintain their position in the system.”
31
Greico, supra note 10, at 155.
32
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 33.
33
Id. at 46.
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disproportionately,34 and might abandon the effort or limit their involvement potential rivals are
receiving benefits far in excess of their own.35 Fear of cheating becomes more acute as the size of
the joint effort grows; as the number of participants increases, so does the cost of monitoring and
enforcement, leading to a greater chance of ‘free-riding.’36 This sensitivity to relative gains is
heightened if the other state is a long-term adversary, if the gain is in military rather than
economic power, or if the home state’s power is already in decline.37 While fear and uncertainty
about cheating and exploitation do not eliminate the chance of cooperation, long-term alliances
are “sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain.”38
Realists note that there is a long historical record of states’ working to shift the balance of
power in their favor, and argue that this proves the predictive power of their theory. For example,
realists point to Japan from 1868 to 1945, the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991, and Germany
from 1862 to 1870 and again from 1900 to 1945 as textbook cases for realist state behavior.39 In
each of these cases, Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union feared foreign invasion or the

34

Greico, supra note 10, at 156. See also MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 52.
Id. See also MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 52.
36
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (2005).
37
Greico, supra note 1010, at 157. See also Robert J. Beck, International Law and International
Relations: The Prospect for Interdisciplinary Collaboration, in INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES
FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996), noting
that “state positionality may constrain the willingness of states to cooperate.”
38
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 51.
39
Id. at 168. Readers may note that military aggression eventually proved the undoing of each of these
states cited above as demonstrating realist behavior. Realists deny that expansionism is ultimately selfdefeating, however, and note that studies have suggested that initiators of wars prevailed in approximately
60% of the 63 wars between 1815 and 1980. See JOHN ARQUILLA, DUBIOUS BATTLES: AGGRESSION,
DEFEAT, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 2 (1992), quoted in MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 39. The
key to victory, structural realists suggest, is for states to avoid overexpansion and to avoid sparking
conflicts that they probably will lose; a goal that requires rational and calculating responses to their
individual circumstances. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 211. One example of beneficial expansion
that developed into self-defeating overexpansion is Germany from 1868 to 1945. During the early part of
this period, Germany under Otto von Bismarck unified and strengthened itself by sparking three wars from
1864-1870, but then largely refrained from further expansion for the next thirty years out of a belief that
“the German Army had conquered about as much territory as it could without provoking a great-power war,
which Germany was likely to lose.” Id. at 184. Its eventual defeat, however, was due to later conflicts
intended to “defeat Germany’s great-power rivals decisively and redraw the map of Europe,” suggesting
that they overreached in attempting to dominate the international system rather than settle for benefiting
disproportionately from it. Id. at 188-190.
35
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encroaching power of potential adversaries into their sphere of influence.40 Accordingly, each
defined its national policy primarily in relation to its security needs, and aggressively sought to
prevent victimization by preemptively increasing its power relative to other states.41 Realists also
point to the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States as a good example
of states positioning for superiority in security and power. Both the US and USSR devoted
considerable resources to gaining a nuclear advantage over the other—far more than required to
achieve military objectives.42 Both sides in this arms race were uncertain of the motives and
intentions of the other and were acutely sensitive to erosions in their numerical or technological
superiority.43
III: What is Transnationalism?
The philosophy of transnationalism suggests that the behavior of states in international
relations should reflect more than just states’ short-term calculations of interest. Transnationalism
is optimistic about human nature and the potential for mutual aid and collaboration, and it holds
that human concern for the welfare of others and cooperative action by states makes international
peace and stability possible.44 Transnationalists argue that great powers should no longer view
each other as competitors and potential military rivals, but instead as a family of nations, an
‘international community.’45 Cooperation, transnationalists argue, is emerging as the defining
characteristic of international relations, with states less likely to compete for security or engage in
war as global economic and political interdependence increases.46 Where conflict does occur, it
is not due to evil intent but rather bad institutions and structural arrangements that encourage
40

Id. 168-190.
Id.
42
Id. 226-233.
43
Id.
44
Kegley, supra note 26, at 4. See also Mark Zacher & Richard A. Matthew, Liberal International Theory:
Common Threads, Divergent Strands, in CONTROVERSIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY:
REALISM AND THE NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE 110 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1995).
45
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 7, at 1.
46
Id. at 360. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, et al., International Law and International Relations
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 370 (1998).
41
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some states to behave selfishly.47 Accordingly, transnationalists believe war is not inevitable and
its frequency can be reduced by improving international institutions and governance, primarily by
encouraging free trade and the spread of democratic values.48
Transnationalists assert that states have binding legal obligations under international law,
rules that derive their authority from a moral community of shared values. Over time,
transnationalists insist, these laws will strengthen into a Wilsonian international system dedicated
to the pursuit of peace, and built on justice, democracy, and respect for human rights.49 This is
not a world government, but instead a Kantian rule-based international society composed of
liberal, sovereign states, in which transnational cooperation “creates mutuality of interest across
national lines.”50 International law, even if imperfect, offers opportunities to, in the words of
Hersch Lauterpacht, “enhance the stability of international peace,..protec[t] of the rights of man,
and..reduc[e] the evils and abuses of national power.”51
Transnationalists, like realists, believe that states are important actors in the international
system, but argue that increasing economic and political interdependence has decreased their
ability to control their own destinies.52 With the spread of globalization, international, nongovernmental institutions such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organization
(WTO) are playing an increasing role in facilitating inter-state cooperation, promoting the
evolution of accepted norms, rules, and decision-making procedures between states. These
institutions make cooperation more beneficial in the long-term than competition, reducing the
overall chance of war. As the number of international issues regulated by these institutions has
increased over time—including human rights, arms control, international economics, and

47

Kegley, supra note 26, at 4.
Id. See generally PHILLIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD xi (2005).
49
Kegley, supra note 26, at 9-10, referring to President Wilson’s quest to imbue the international system
with “moral purpose with a sense of responsibility for the practical consequences of ideals.”
50
Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2611 (1997).
51
Steven R. Ratner, International Law: The Trials of Global Norms, 110 FOREIGN POLICY 65, 66 (1998).
52
Kegley, supra note 26, at 43.
48
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international environmental issues—national sovereignty has yielded control over matters that
once were exclusively within the jurisdiction of states.53
Transnationalism as a doctrine gained strength since the end of World War II, and traces its
philosophical roots to President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918 and then to the 1941
Atlantic Charter.54 While Wilson’s vision of a just international community based on democracy,
free trade, and self-determination never materialized, similar values enshrined in the Atlantic
Charter codified the fundamental principles for the west’s post-war order. In that instrument, US
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill called for states to
refrain from using force against each other except where authorized by the community of nations,
obligated states to maintain the “inherent dignity” and “equal and inalienable rights” of man, and
promised to promote economic liberalization through free trade.55 While the Charter was only a
statement of shared values vice a binding legal instrument, subsequent events—such as the
formation of the Bretton Woods economic institutions in 1947 and the enactment of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948—codified the Charter’s core values.56

53

Koh, supra note 50, at 2624. See generally Slaughter, supra note 46, at 370.
US President Woodrow Wilson can be considered one of the founding fathers of the policy doctrine of
liberalism. In the wake of World War I, he argued that international security should not be based on a
balance of powers between great nations, but rather predicated on democracy, free trade, and the universal
rights of man, and overseen by an international mechanism dedicated to the preservation of peace. See
generally MARGARET MACMILLIAN, PARIS 1919 12-13, 20-24 (2003).
55
THE ATLANTIC CHARTER (1941), reprinted in SANDS, supra note 48. “The President of the United States
of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national
policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.
…First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;…they respect the right of all peoples to
choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;…they will endeavor, with due
respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or
vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed
for their economic prosperity;… they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in
the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement
and social security;…they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual
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sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression
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It was the 1990’s, however, that proved to transnationalism’s most important period. The
collapse of the Iron Curtain and the rapid spread of democracy across Eastern Europe triggered a
surge of optimism about a ‘new world order’ in which rule-governed interdependence would be
the foundation of an enduring global peace.57 For almost ten years, transnationalists’ visions for a
just international society were bolstered by the accelerating ‘legalization’ of international
relations, the increasing strength and influence of international institutions, and the success of
numerous multinational UN deployments—such as the Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.58
These developments led many transnationalists to believe that “international legal rules,
procedures, and organizations are more visible and arguably more effective than at any time since
1945. If the United Nations cannot accomplish everything, it once again represents a significant
repository of hopes for a better world.”59
During the 1990’s, the Clinton Administration articulated much of its foreign policy in
transnationalist terms, expressing optimism for the emergence of transnationalism as the
dominant theory in international relations for the 21st century. Arguing that democratic and
prosperous states are unlikely to fight each other, and that international institutions enabled states
to avoid war and concentrate on building cooperative relationships, President Clinton disputed the
place of realpolitik in the 21st century. “In a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march,”
he stated in 1992, “the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is illsuited to a new era.”60 “Enlightened self-interest, as well as shared values,” he asserted, “will
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compel countries to define their greatness in more constructive ways…and will compel us to
cooperate.”61
The first and most important principle of internationalism is that states have binding legal and
moral obligations codified in international law.62 While it is not law in the traditional domestic
sense, international law is binding because it is based on shared norms and “specific legal
commitments which bind states…contained in treaties and other formal agreements to which
[they] have given their explicit consent.”63 States follow customary international norms out of a
sense of opinio juris, a sense of legal and moral obligation,64 or because they have given their
consent to be bound through international treaties or conventions, pacta sunt servanda.65

61

Id.
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 36, at 187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 101 (1986), defining international law as “Rules and principles of general application dealing with the
conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of
their relations with persons, whether natural or judicial.”
63
Kocs, supra note 20, at 538. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(1) (1986),
defining a rule of international law as “one that has been accepted as such by the international community
of states, in the form of customary law; by international agreement; or by derivation from general principles
common to the major legal systems of the world.” See also Kocs, supra note 20, at 538, noting that
international law is not law in the traditional domestic sense but rather a “system of rules which conduces
to a fairly high level of perceived obligation among members of a voluntarist community.” See generally
Anthony Clark Arend, Toward an Understanding of International Legal Rules, in INTERNATIONAL RULES:
APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 293 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds.,
1996).
64
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1986), stating that “customary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation.”
65
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. “Pacta sunt
servanda; every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith." See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), holding that "The law is of universal
obligation and no statute of one or two nations can create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of
nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of force, not because it was
prescribed by any superior power, but because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct....This is
not giving to the statutes of any nation extraterritorial effect…but it is recognition of the historical fact that
by common consent of mankind these rules have been acquiesced in as of general obligation." See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 81, at §102(b) cmt. (1986). The
“’Practice of states’ includes diplomatic acts and instructions as well as public measures and other
governmental acts and official statements of policy….there is no precise formula to indicate how
widespread a practice must be [to constitute sufficient evident of customary law], but it should reflect wide
acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity.”
62

16

Transnationalists’ faith in the authority of international law is also based in part on
conceptions of an international ‘moral community.’66 Akin to the civitas maxima in Roman
jurisprudence, transnationalists believe in a larger body politic, an intangible international whole
from which emerges a collective social bond that contains “duties which transcend the interests of
the singular.”67 Law is more than a force that binds states; it is an expression of basic values
shared by all, such as human rights, democracy, and justice.68 Law, as enacted by states in an
international community, becomes a realization of those values and exerts a ‘normative pull’ on
state behavior, bringing them into compliance with accepted norms.69 As stated by Anne-Marie
Slaughter, former President of the American Society of International Law, “In a genuine
community bound together by common values, ‘the law’ can be identified as the authoritative
expression of those values.”70
Third, transnationalists have greater optimism for interstate cooperation than realists, and
believe that international institutions improve the odds of interstate cooperation and reduce the
overall likelihood of war.71 By creating an environment where cooperation is more beneficial
than competition, international institutions and law can help states work together to achieve
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mutually beneficial outcomes and overcome suspicions and obstacles.72 These institutions help
states to abstain from short-term power maximizing behavior by creating an institutional
framework that sets norms of state behavior, reduces verification costs, creates iterativeness, and
facilitates the identification and punishment of cheaters. 73
Fourth, transnationalists favor the continued erosion of the sovereignty of the state in favor of
non-state actors. They have applauded the rapid expansion of the role of international legal
regimes since the end of the Cold War, and their increasing encroachment on issues previously
viewed as the exclusive domain of the state.74 Transnationalists argue that these international
institutions are in the best position to manage the interactions of states and address global
problems—such as climate change, poverty, and diseases such as AIDS and Avian Influenza—
beyond the capacity of any one state to resolve.75 “Not even the strongest of states,” notes one
scholar, “can protect its individuals against economic forces, or against the risks of war which
modern technical developments have made so destructive that humanity can no longer afford to
use it.”76
Fifth, transnationalists have an abiding skepticism on the utility of force as a tool in
international relations. In sharp contrast to realists, who argue that violence is inevitable due to
the anarchical nature of the international system, transnationalists argue that international legal
norms and institutions reduce the chance of violence between states.77 International instruments
such as the UN Charter have created a “normative environment that strongly discourages war
initiation between law abiding states.”78 Through consensual compliance with international
treaties such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the UN Charter, states have willingly accepted a
customary “norm of illegality” for wars waged outside of self-defense, prohibiting force as an
72
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instrument of national policy.79 As stated by international jurist and scholar Antonio Cassesse,
“peace became the supreme goal of the world community and states decided to agree upon
serious and sweeping self-limitations of their sovereign prerogatives in the form of the mutual
obligation to refrain from using or threatening force.”80
Finally, transnationalists also assert that increasing democratization and high levels of
economic interdependence among states reduce the likelihood of violence.81 It is a
transnationalist truism that democracies seldom if ever go to war against each other, and
accordingly they argue that long-term international stability is most likely under a liberal
economic order that facilitates free and equitable economic exchanges between states.82 Greater
international prosperity and democratization reduces the number of revisionist states unhappy
with their lot, while increased economic interdependence makes war less profitable by disrupting
the network of interdependence that is enriching them.83
IV: Can Transnationalism and Realism Co-Exist?
At first glance, realism and transnationalism seem mutually exclusive. The two doctrines,
while seeking to explain how and why states interact with each other, reside at opposite ends of
the ideological spectrum. They hold opposing views on the structural nature of the international
system, the duty to comply with international law, the likelihood of international cooperation, the
place of morality in international affairs, the role of force in the international system, and the
transparency of state motives. Realists are critical of the structural shortcomings of the
international system, particularly the lack of centralized enforcement and adjudication. They
argue that there is no duty to comply with international law, although states sometimes do so
79
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when those rules are beneficial to them. They also believe that the threat and use of force are
inevitable in relations between states, and that the suspicion of the intentions and motives of other
limits the likelihood of cooperation between states. As the fear of predation by others forces
states to obtain and pursue power by any means, realists argue, state action cannot be judged by
domestic moral standards. Additionally, the unpopularity of the pursuit of power and the need to
confuse or divide rivals often requires states to provide legal or moral rationalizations for selfserving behavior.
In contrast, transnationalists believe that states comply with international norms and laws
even in the absence of enforcement for a number of different reasons—including a respect for the
values they embody, a belief that the process is legitimate, institutional habit, or because they
recognize the erosion of the international system would threaten their security in the long term.
States also recognize international law’s obligatory nature because they have consented to be
bound through treaties or because the law is based on the practice of states. Cooperation is not
only likely between states, transnationalists argue, but is necessary and beneficial in an
international system where self-sufficiency is increasingly difficult and where long-term
compliance with international norms offers more benefits than a short-term pursuit of interests.
As international interdependence is increasing, violence and the threat of violence is becoming
anachronistic; power is no longer based only on military strength and is developing political,
economic, and cultural dimensions. While rogue states may still rationalize their selfish behavior
in legalistic terms, transnationalists argue, the fact that they feel the need to refer to these norms
at all suggests the authority of those rules.
A. Structural and Compliance Issues
The structural weaknesses in the international community have long been a focus for realists’
criticism. They argue that the institutional shortcomings of the ‘international order’—especially
its lack of central enforcement or authoritative judiciary—force states to provide for their own
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security. The central quality of any legal system, realists argue, is a mechanism for enforcement
and the threat of punishment; legal systems that lack such a mechanism lack “the essential quality
of law.”84 Secondly, realists argue that international law is not ‘real law’ because there is no
effective judiciary capable of rendering authoritative judgments on what it really means.85 This
lack of an official interpretative body leads to crippling ambiguities, as “states are the judges of
their own lawful behavior.”86 Moreover, compromises in the terms of international law made to
secure broad consensus further dilutes its specificity, magnifying states’ ability to manipulate the
law to justify their own agendas. Without an effective international judicial body to provide
authoritative rulings, realists argue, international law is merely a vehicle for justifying pursuit of
states’ interest.87 As stated by one observer, the freedom of states “to define the rules for
themselves, particularly where…[they are] highly general and strong political motives govern
behavior, builds into a strong case for rule-skepticism.”88
Without any international central authority capable of enforcing the law or authoritatively
defining it, realists argue, anarchy remains the defining characteristic of the international system.
Because there is nothing to prevent states from using force against each other, states must seek to
maximize their power in order to guarantee their security, while international regimes,
84
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institutions, rules, and norms affect the prospects for stability only at the margins.89 In the words
of Stanley Hoffman, international law as a system of restraint “is weak law” in an international
system “in which…restraint on behavior happens to be the crucial issue.”90 Accordingly,
Hoffman concludes, because the anarchical nature of the international system is static, “legal
attempts at constraint have so far been in vain.”91
Rather than reflecting an embodiment of shared norms, realists argue, the international
system is an expression of the established balance of power between dominant states.92
International rules and norms, they insist, are “purely reflective of the power and interests of
states: they are just power politics translated into a different idiom,”93 or “arenas for acting out
power relationships.”94 Accordingly, state compliance with norms that preserve international
order—such as the article 2(4) prohibitions on the use of force except in self defense—are a “byproduct of the self-interested behavior of the system’s great powers [and the] unintended
consequence of great-power security competition, not the result of states acting together to
organize peace.”95
Few transnationalists dispute realists’ contention that the international community is a “legal
system of imperfect obligation.”96 They dismiss, however, realists’ presumptions that the law has
to be centrally enforced in order to be strong. There are important differences between
international law and domestic criminal law; instead of punishing mundane, daily offenses,
international law regulates behavior of states—large institutions, with highly complex
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interactions.97 A more accurate paradigm than the enforcement model is that of constitutional
law; like international law, constitutional law deals with the behavior of large collectives,
conflicting interests of great importance, and has a minimal enforcement mechanism based
primarily on the consent of participants.98 Like international law, constitutional law seeks to
prevent conflict, rather than punish violations.99 The frequent ambiguity of fundamental
principles in both constitutional and international law suggest that subjectivity is not a deficiency
of those bodies of law, transnationalists argue, but rather an indication of the importance of the
interests they seek to reconcile.100
The domestic criminal paradigm, transnationalists argue, is further inapplicable to
international law because it creates unreasonable expectations about levels of compliance.
Violations of a body of law do not discredit that body of law—as suggested by realists—and
transnationalists point out that even strong domestic criminal legal regimes have high rates of
violation.101 “If one examines the domestic incidence of murder or rebellion in the best-ordered
society,” asserts Richard Falk, “the record discloses a frequency of violation that would
disappoint any legal perfectionist.”102 Violations of international norms are inevitable not
because of a lack of effective constraint, but because there is an “inevitable discrepancy” between
how people ought to behave and how they actually do.103 The power of law to secure
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compliance, Franck argues, is not based on coercion and enforcement, but rather the “general
belief of those to whom the law is addressed that they have a stake in the rule of law itself—that
law is binding because it is the law.”104
Transnationalists concede that the ambiguity of international norms and law resulting from
the absence of an authoritative judiciary means that “reasonable persons can differ” on the
definitions of permitted behavior.105 They argue, however, that varying interpretations of law are
an inevitable component of any legal regime, international or domestic. International political
disputes about national rights will inevitably lead to a clash of opposing legal interpretations,
“just as we…expect that a private dispute about rights and duties will lead opposing counsel to
develop contradictory interpretations of the relevant legal rules.”106 But despite these differences
in opinion, transnationalists insist, transnational rules and norms have core meanings which are
clear and generally accepted throughout the international community.107 For example, while
transnationalists differ on some aspects of the rules regulating the use of force—for example, the
scope of exceptions such as pre-emptive attacks, humanitarian intervention, and implied
authorization from the UN Security Council—the underlying principle, a prohibition on
international aggression, is clear. While there is no determinative adjudication, third party
judgments are in fact made by other states, and “international rules are not frequently seen as
providing an independent benchmark against which to assess the justification of behavior…which
is politically or morally contentious.”108
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Furthermore, many transnationalists insist that the lack of central enforcement is irrelevant
provided that states still comply with international norms and laws in its absence.109 If states
can be proven to still moderate their actions even in the absence of enforcement, scholars such as
Louis Henkin argue, then the lack of an enforcement mechanism is immaterial. “What matters is
whether international law is reflected in the policies of nations and in relations between
nations….the question is not whether law is enforceable or even effectively enforced; rather
whether law is observed, whether it governs or influences behavior, whether international
behavior reflects stability and order.”110 He continues by arguing that “law observance, not
violation, is the common way of nations.”111 Citing realists’ apparent misimpression that
“international law is sown with violated norms and broken treaties,”112 Henkin asserts that
compliance with international norms is a daily occurrence in international relations. “Every day
nations respect the borders of other nations, treat foreign diplomats and citizens…as required by
law, [and] observe thousands of treaties.”113 Other transnationalists, such as Thomas Franck,
make similar arguments. Suggesting that “rules are not enforced yet they are mostly obeyed,”114
Franck highlights the “not inconsequential amount of habitual state obedience to rules and
acceptance of obligations despite the underdeveloped condition of the system’s structures,
processes, and of course, enforcement mechanisms.”115
Transnationalists further argue that the lack of central enforcement is irrelevant because, as in
domestic law, obedience to the law is based on more than physical coercion.116 States, like
109
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people, comply with rules for a variety of reasons, including a sense of duty or honor, belief in
the legitimacy of those rules, institutionalized habit or inertia, or self-interest.117 Most
importantly, transnationalists assert, international law is binding on states because states accept
that it is binding on them.118 They do so mainly because those rules coincide with their own
principles of legitimacy and because they institutionalize principles of international behavior that
are in states’ interest—such sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.119 Accordingly,
international law is ‘legal’ in that it embodies accepted norms in state behavior, defining with a
“certain solemnity” the political framework of international relations, establishing rights and
duties designed to give a “measure of stability and certainty” to those relations.120 Louis Henkin
makes a similar argument, suggesting that international law establishes the ‘submerged rules’ of
states’ expected behavior with the system, codifying basic, necessary principles for their daily
functions and interactions:121
Although there is no international ‘government,’ there is an international ‘society’; law
includes the structure of that society, its institutions, forms, and procedures for daily activity,
the assumptions on which the society is founded and the concepts which permeate it, the
status, rights, responsibilities, obligations of the nations which comprise that society, the
122
various relations between them, and the effects of those relations.

Most importantly, international rules establish accepted criteria on which national governments
can be perceived as acting reasonably.123 This establishes thresholds for state behavior that
provide suggested courses of behavior for states to take in order to avoid escalating tensions. In
this manner, the central principles of customary international law —sovereignty, self-
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determination, honoring of treaty commitments—allow states to act in a manner accepted as
reasonable or non-threatening to other states, reducing the overall likelihood or severity of war.124
Law also plays an important role in structuring the functions of international relations and
providing a framework for states’ daily interactions. It coordinates expectations, communicates
claims and provides the subjects with a zone of predictability which reduces uncertainty over the
motives of other states.125 Law provides mechanisms and procedures by which nations maintain
their relations, carry on trade, and peacefully resolve their differences.126 It contributes to order
and stability and provides a basis and a framework for common enterprise and mutual
intercourse.127 There is also a shared recognition that erosion of these norms would be costly in
the long-term;128 once states see themselves as having a stake in guaranteeing the continuance of
the international legal system, transnationalists argue, then the idea of obligation to international
rules can acquire legitimacy and distance from the immediate interests of states.129
States may also consent to be bound by international law due to their perceptions of proper
behavior or a desire to avoid a loss of reputation that might have long-term negative
consequences.130 “Considerations of ‘honor,’ ‘prestige,’ ‘leadership,’ ‘influence,’ ‘reputation,’”
notes Louis Henkin, “figure prominently in governmental decisions [and] often weigh in favor of
observing law.”131 If, as suggested by Henkin above, law codifies the basic rules of coexistence
among states, it also mobilizes compliance with accepted rules;132 states may decide to comply
with the law because they fear the extra-legal consequences if they do not. While there is no
central enforcement mechanism in the international system, states exert ‘extra-legal’ pressures
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upon each other that often induce compliance.133 The most powerful of these is reciprocity; states
fear that others will retaliate in kind for violations, leading to losses in other dealings or
disruptions of a rule-based order which has proved profitable for the violator.134 Even if a state is
opposed to a particular principle of law, Henkin suggests, it will continue to comply with
international law writ large in order to avoid reciprocal violations that would threaten the norms
they do care about.135 As stated by Henkin, “Even the rich and mighty cannot commonly obtain
what they want by force or dictation and must be prepared to pay the price of reciprocal or
compensating obligation.”136
Other transnationalists suggest that states comply with largely unenforceable international
rules because they feel those rules are legitimate or recognize them as a moral obligation of
statehood.137 According to Thomas Franck, nations obey rules because “they perceive the rule
and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy.”138 Rules are perceived as
legitimate, he argues, because they come into being in accordance with prescription for legitimate
133
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rule-making, incorporate principles of fairness, or embody a shared sense of justice.139 It is this
legitimacy, he argues, that creates compliance because those addressed believe that the rule or
institution has “come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of
right process.”140
Transnationalists argue that the “habit and inertia of continued compliance” within
bureaucratic process, or a culture of compliance within governmental institutions, is in part
responsible for states complying with international law. For example, Hadley Bull argues that
states obey international law due to “habit or inertia; they are…programmed to operate within the
framework of established principles.”141 Others have made similar arguments, suggesting that
bureaucracies operate on the basis of reciprocity, restraint, fairness, reasonableness, and a respect
for rules, and once international principles are internalized into these organizations, compliance
becomes habitual.142
States may also recognize rules as a price of membership in the international community or of
recognition by other states. There is a general impression that since the end of the Second World
War, states have given greater weight to considerations of commonly-shared values, and some
have argued that this recognition of shared values and interests “presuppose[s] the existence of a
community that postulates…moral imperatives requiring certain actions and compelling the
refraining of others.”143 Complying with accepted standards of behavior is thus seen as an
acknowledgement of a moral obligation, or compliance to a larger set of values which the state
believes is binding upon it.144 As stated by Thomas Franck, states “recognize that the obligation
to comply is owed by them to the community of states as the reciprocal of that community’s
139
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validation of their nation’s statehood.”145 Louis Henkin agrees, asserting that “more or less
willingly, all governments give up some autonomy and freedom and accept international law in
principle as the price of ‘membership’ in international society and of having relations with other
nations.”146
Both realists and transnationalists agree that compliance with international norms and laws in
some cases can be beneficial to states’ security. It is in this perceived self-interest, argues Hedley
Bull, where real strength of international law resides. Its importance “does not rest on the
willingness of states to abide by its principles to the detriment of their interests, but in the fact
that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it.”147 For example, states are reluctant
to breach the legal constraints on the use of force imposed by law because those constraints also
limit other states from using force against them.148 One scholar observes that “states follow
specific rules, even when inconvenient, because they have a longer-term interest in the
maintenance of law-impregnated international community.”149 For smaller, especially weaker,
states there is an inherent value of supporting a rule-based international order that is more
predictable and transparent than a realist, Hobbsean state of nature.150 Additionally, rich and
powerful states have a disproportionate stake in maintaining the stability of the status quo in
which they are dominant.151 While transnationalists concede that powerful states can get away
with occasional violations of the law, they argue that even powerful states recognize that blatant
rule-breaking that might disrupt the legal order on which their own prosperity or security
ultimately depends.152
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Ironically, realists rely on very similar arguments to assert the opposite conclusion—that law
is merely an instrument of power.153 Because an orderly international system is in the interest of
smaller states, realists argue, powerful states use international law as a “means of regulation as
well as pacification and stabilization of their dominance.”154 International laws and institutions
institutionalize the political status quo at the time of their drafting, and are resistant to subsequent
shifts in the balance of power. Accordingly, powerful states may comply with international law
because it preserves an international order in where they are dominant, especially if the state is
unable to enforce that dominance through extra-legal means.155 International institutions also give
weaker states increased influence, encouraging them to concede to the established balance of
power, thereby lowering the costs of pacification for great powers.156 International law’s
emphasis on past precedent and order allows “previous generations to rule over present ones,”
preventing rising powers from remaking the international legal order in their own image.157
Accordingly, system-wide perceptions of the legally binding nature of international law is a social
construct manufactured by larger states that serves to cement their grip on system-wide
dominance.158
A long body of realist scholarship has criticized the transnationalist contention that states
obey international law even when it is not in their self-interest, arguing that a rational pursuit of
interests is the source of purported respect by states to international norms and laws. States
comply with international law, realists argue, because they believe the results will help them
achieve national interests, or because they fear “retaliation from the other state or some kind of
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reputational loss” that might ultimately damage their security.159 “States do not act in accordance
with a rule that they feel obliged to follow;” writes one. “They act because it is in their interests
to do so. The rule does not cause the states’ behavior; it reflects their behavior.”160 Other authors
have challenged whether states actually feel a sense of legal obligation in complying with
customary law, arguing that “scholars who think that customary international law results from a
sense of legal obligation fail to distinguish between a pattern of behavior and the motives that
cause states to act in accordance with that pattern.”161
One of the most recent assaults on transnationalist theories of compliance was made by Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner, two prominent scholars within the legal realist school. In their book,
The Limits of International Law, Goldsmith and Posner argue that “international law emerges
from states acting rationally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the interests of
other states and the distribution of state power.”162 In a study of compliance with international
law, Posner and Goldsmith found that compliance with international law was directly linked to
states’ perceptions of the benefits of compliance. “Preferences for international law compliance,”
the two wrote, “tend to depend on whether such compliance will bring security, economic
growth, and related goods; and that...[nations] are willing to forgo international law compliance
when such compliance comes at the cost of these other goods.”163 Goldsmith and Posner found
no evidence that states were pulled to comply with international law because it reflects morally
valid procedures or internal value sets. 164 Instead, states were most likely to make or comply with
treaty obligations when there was a coincidence of interest, or when the treaty required no more
of the states “than they would do on their own.”165 This behavior persisted into long-term
compliance when the party to the treaty obtained sustained benefits that outweighed the benefits
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of violation. “States independently pursuing their own interests will engage in symmetrical or
identical actions [such as cooperation and compliance] simply because they gain nothing from
deviating from those actions.”166 Accordingly, Posner and Goldsmith concluded that
“International law is not a check on state-self interest; it is a product of state self-interest,”167 and
that “possibilities for what international law can achieve are limited by configurations of state
interests.”168
Realists also doubt that full compliance with international norms can be achieved as the
pursuit of states’ national security often comes that the expense of other states. Accordingly, it is
difficult to reach mutual international accommodation among groups of states when acting to
secure national interests. In the words of Charles De Visscher, “interests that governments hold
to be intimately connected with the preservation or development of state power must be classified
as very generally refractory to legal integration. Treaties that touch upon these interests…spring
from momentary convergences of policy and do not survive their passing.”169 Realists further
argue that while compliance with international law may be to states’ benefit much of the time,
international law and custom is not always synonymous with national interest. Compliance from
the law is not a guarantee of safety from aggressors, who rarely follow international rules; states
must still accumulate and preserve power to safeguard their security—in violation of international
law, if need be—because effective international protection may not be forthcoming.170
Transnationalists concede that self-interest plays a role in obtaining state compliance to
international law. They rely on the normative nature of transnationalism, however, to argue that
international norms are developing and strengthening with time. While self-interest currently
exerts a powerful pull towards compliance, this will eventually evolve into a rule-based structural
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framework for the international system as states’ acceptance of those rules increases.171 This
process towards obligatory, well-defined legal rules will continue, transnationalists argue, as long
as states internalize and self-enforce international norms.172 While they do not always obey the
letter of the law now, the fact that it has been codified at all represents a first step on the way to
broader compliance. For example, Charles De Visscher notes that while the Briand-Kellogg Pact
is generally not complied with by states, but its general acceptance as a foundation of the
international legal order enters it into the international conscience. “The significance of the
Briand-Kellogg Pact lies in the moral imperative,” De Visscher argues. “Such an imperative, so
long as it lives in the consciences of men, survives the weaknesses of positive organization;
sooner or later it imposes itself on the legal order.”173 In another example, transnationalists point
to the gradual extension of criminal liability to individuals for war crimes as one example of
international legal norms solidifying into enforced standards of conduct. Once primarily based on
reciprocity, criminal liability for war crimes has slowly strengthened into an enforceable system
of binding rules, as seen in the Nuremberg Principles and the International War Crimes Tribunals
for Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and elsewhere.174
B. Likelihood and Importance of Interstate Cooperation
Realists and transnationalists disagree on the prospects and importance of international
cooperation. Realists believe that the anarchical structure of the international system limits the
likelihood of sustained cooperation; states are more likely to compete because each is attempting
to maintain or strengthen its position in relation to other states, who may be future rivals. While
171
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short-term cooperation may take place when states band together to oppose the emergence of a
powerful adversary, the zero-sum nature of power and security limits permanent, system-wide
alliances.175 In contrast, transnationalists insist that realists underestimate the impact that
international institutions can have on facilitating international cooperation.176 Economic selfreliance and self-sufficiency have become less and less possible,177 transnationalists argue, and
now a wide variety of transnational issues—such as international trade and commercial
transactions, environmental matters, intellectual property, and foreign investment—are too wide
reaching for any single state to effectively manage by itself.178 These dealings are best managed
by international regimes that make participants’ behavior more predictable and encourage
multilateral cooperation and compliance.179 These regimes do not enforce rules per se, but rather
change the costs and benefits of joint efforts to favor cooperation, creating a constructive
environment for cooperation under which states receive higher payoffs from cooperation than if
they do not.180 Under such a framework, sustained cooperation is more profitable than repeated
‘go it alone’ negotiations, as compliance with pre-established accepted procedures eases
uncertainty by limiting the range of expected behaviors, eliminates the need to renegotiate terms,
reduces verification and transaction costs, and creates economies of scale through repeated
transactions.181 In effect, regimes alter the cost-benefit calculus, creating ‘coincidences of
interest’ for all players where long-term cooperation is more profitable than a pursuit of
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immediate interests.182 In the words of Robert Keohane, “they do not override self-interest but
rather affect calculations of self-interest.”183
Institutions also lengthen the “shadow of the future” by increasing transparency and overall
accountability for violation of accepted procedures, facilitating the identification and punishment
of cheaters or ‘free-riders.’184 Participants serve as regimes’ enforcement mechanism, with issue
linkages allowing states to retaliate on violators in other dealings, raising the costs of deception
and cheating beyond just a single issue group.185 This dramatically increases the penalties for
defecting, thereby reducing participants’ likelihood of being double-crossed or exploited by
partners.186 In increasing overall accountability within the system, international regimes “link the
future with the present,” and insure that a given violation will be treated not as an isolated
incident but as one in a series of interrelated actions by other states.187 As stated by Keohane and
Axelrod, “international regimes do not substitute for reciprocity; rather they reinforce and
institutionalize it. Regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity de-legitimize defection and
thereby make it more costly.”188

C. Should there be a Moral Dimension to State Behavior?
Realists have long criticized the moral overtones of transnationalism, which they contend is
an erroneous extension the ethics of domestic law and life into an international forum.189 They
argue that because of the zero-sum nature of power in the international community, policymakers
have historically not been held to the bounds of domestic morality. In the words of Frederick
Schuman, “In all politics those who acquire power, wield it, and seek to retain it, have from time
182
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immemorial been judged to occupy a position with respect to moral standards which is not quite
the same as that of ordinary citizens or private entrepreneurs.”190 “Those who call ‘power
politicians’ immoral simply because they play the game of power politics,” continues Kenneth
Waltz, “have transferred a definition of immorality from one social setting to another, and in the
other it is not applicable without serious qualification.”191
One of the most vocal criticisms of the moral aspects of transnationalism came from George
F. Kennan, the chief architect of the policy of containment and one of the most influential figures
in US diplomacy during the Cold War.192 In a 1951 lecture, he charged that the “legalisticmoralistic approach to international problems” constituted the “most serious fault” in past US
foreign policy.193 Deriding as misguided the “belief that it should be possible to suppress the
chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of
some system of legal rules and restraints,”194 Kennan argued that such an approach is not suited
for dealing with revisionist states and questioned the propriety of limiting international behavior
to the confines of domestic morality:
The idea of the subordination of a large number of states to an international juridical regime,
limiting their possibilities for aggression and injury to other states, implies that these are all
states like our own, reasonably content with their international borders and status…[which
has] generally been true only of a portion of international society….[But] there is a greater
deficiency…the inevitable association of legalistic ideas with moralistic ones: the carrying
over into the affairs of states of the concepts of right and wrong, the assumption that state
195
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Kennan, along with other prominent scholars such as former Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, believed that codes of conduct for state behavior should reflect the actual
behavior of states, rather than play a normative role in suggesting how they should behave.196
Realists argue that international law has evolved into an unrealistic ideological code that is
unconnected to the actual practice of statecraft. “The received rules of international law,” argues
Michael Glennon, “neither describe accurately what nations do nor predict reliably what they will
do, nor prescribe intelligently what they should do.”197
Transnationalists dispute that compliance with international norms is merely a distillation of
ethnical norms. Instead, international law merely codifies standards states accept on their own
conduct; “law is not a description of actual behavior, nor a prediction of future behavior, nor a
system of moral or ethical norms,” argues one transnationalist. “Law is composed of the norms
that are accepted by a society as prescriptions for behavior.”198 To argue that these factors are
purely moralistic, transnationalists insist, ignores the “lessons of justified pragmatic
considerations, enlightened self-interest, and prudent judgment.”199
D. The Use of Force in International Relations
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Realism and transnationalism are profoundly different in their views on the role of force in
international relations. For realists, violence, and the threat of violence, is inseparable from
international politics, a condition reflected in the structure of the international system.200 Because
there is nothing to prevent the outbreak of war, states are forced to protect their security and vital
interests by whatever means necessary—including force—or else risk destruction by other
states.201 Accordingly, the protection of state interests and defense against potential aggressors
trump legal restrictions on the use of force. “There are certain international situations of conflict
and crisis,” states Richard Falk, “in which the overriding goals of national policy are chosen
almost independently of what the law, impartially assessed, might be supposed to inquire.”202
Where states choose to avoid employing force, it is not due to respect for the law, realists argue,
but for some other self-serving consideration, such as the deterrent factor of the threat of violence
in return.203
Realism, transnationalists counter, is no longer an adequate theory for explaining state
behavior because the use of force is becoming less common in the developed world; in the words
of one British diplomat, “a large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or
conquer.”204 The exponential growth of economic interdependence, transnationalists assert, has
made the cost of war too prohibitive for states to consider.205 Instead, states now profit most from
commercial exchanges with other countries, and they often rely on others to help achieve national
goals, such as growth, full employment, and price stability.206 Accordingly, each state has an
interest in greater global stability, and views other states as potential partners rather than rivals.207
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Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye is one of several Clinton-era former
policymakers who have been outspoken in their advocacy of transnationalist values in American
foreign policy. The Clausewitzian acceptance of force as an instrument of policy, Nye argues, is
a relic of the past, based on outdated virtues of 19th century realpolitik.208 While state security
was historically linked to military force, power in the information age is now “becoming less
tangible and less coercive, particularly among the advanced countries.”209 Power, Nye contends,
has become multi-dimensional, incorporating all elements of states’ influence:
Power today is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex-three
dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar [in favor
of the United States]. But on the middle chessboard, economic power is multipolar, with the
United States, Europe, and Japan, representing two-thirds of the world’s product. The
bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of
government control…power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of
210
unipolarity.

In order to fully succeed in the 21st century, Nye argues, great powers such as the United States
must work to dominate the non-military components of power, an effort that will require more
economic and cultural ‘soft power.’211 For example, Nye argues that “the United States should
help develop and maintain international regimes of laws and institutions that organize
international action in various domains—not just the trade and environment, but weapons
proliferation, peacekeeping, human rights, terrorism, and other concerns.”212 By exporting US
values and culture, our democratic traditions, promoting peace and human rights, and respecting
the opinions of others, the US can exercise more power and influence in the world than if it
208
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employed force alone.213 An open and pluralistic foreign policy can reduce surprises in
transnational relations, allow others to have a voice, and create a forum where we can exercise
our soft power.214 “By resting our actions on a legal basis (and accepting its correlative
restraints),” Nye argues, “we can make the continued exercise of our disproportionate power
easier for others to accept.”215
E. The Transparency of State Motives
As explained above, realists and transnationalists differ sharply on why states act the way
they do. Realists contend that if states obey international law they do so out of a sense of selfinterest, while transnationalists argue states respect the norms of international law and behavior
out of a respect for those laws. The difficulty of determining the course of the decision-making
process has limited efforts to determine the motives behind their behavior. Gaps or ambiguities
in the official record, the twists of institutional decision-making, irrationality on the part of
government officials, and the clouding effect of official rhetoric often obscure the reasons why
one course of action was chosen over another.
A lack of transparency in national decision-making processes poses the largest obstacle for
explaining why states act the way they do. Adequate records do not exist, are classified, or do not
address underlying motives. Key officials, when willing or able to be interviewed, may have a
limited perspective on the larger issue, and even when the various institutional forces affecting
decision-making are evident, it is difficult to determine their relative weights and influence in the
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process.216 States’ decision-making process may not always be rational; policymakers’ decisions
are often based on incomplete or inaccurate information, may be hampered by poor planning or
slanted by institutional or personal bias. Furthermore, decisions are made under the considerable
pressure of time and political scrutiny, and may be emotional or irrational in response to
provocative events.217 In the end, Louis Henkin complains, “the processes by which decisions in
foreign policy are made are mysterious…. sometimes [it] is not made; it happens, and can only be
later sorted out of the confusions of many actions and inactions.”218 As a result, ambiguity in
states’ motives allows scholars and academics from different fields or ideological leanings to
interpret the same set of facts very differently. As stated by Louis Henkin, “the lawyer may see
what law there is and what law does; the critic may see only what law there is not and what law
has not achieved.”219
One of the few substantive sources about the reasons for state behavior is their public
rhetoric, but transnationalists and realists disagree as to the meaning and importance of what they
say. For example, states often provide legal or moral justifications for their actions, no matter
how self-serving those actions are. For example, in regards to the use of force, regardless of the
nature or purpose of the conflict, states frequently claim legal justification under the UN Charter
on the grounds of self-defense, invitation, humanitarian intervention, or protection of the rights of
oppressed minorities.220 As stated by Charles De Visscher, “even when [states] violate treaties,
rulers are careful not to dispute the respect due to the given word; from the written text they
appeal to some higher principle, to the right of self-preservation, to inevitable change, to natural
law, to the laws of eternal morality. Every political enterprise is clothed in some kind of moral
216
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justification; every program of expansion combines with the use of force the formulas of a
civilizing ideal.”221 Even Adolf Hitler, notes Louis Henkin, “pretended that he was acting
consistently with Germany’s international obligations at the time of his most terrible
violations.”222 Accordingly, it is very difficult to know the true motives behind state action, as
talk does not always equal intent.
Realists assert that this talk is mere propaganda, intended to avoid the unpopularity of the
naked pursuit of power among western political constituencies.223 Legal and moral rhetoric,
realists argue, are “pretexts” for actions motivated by a desire for power.224 While policymakers
speak the language of internationalism and political morality in public, they continue, behind
closed doors, the “elites who make national security policy speak mostly in the language of
power, not that of principle…a discernible gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct
of…foreign policy.”225 When legal arguments are made, they are done to justify a position made
on the basis of the pursuit of power, “so that official action will seem legally defensible,
especially in the eyes of domestic opinion.”226 Ethical principles, even if invoked in public, have
“no operational function save as devices to rationalize the quest for aggrandizement and thus to
persuade the gullible that the dictates of realpolitik are equivalent to the injunctions of
morality.”227
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Transnationalists dismiss these arguments, asserting that the fact that states feel the need to
rationalize their behavior in the language of legalism indicates that those norms maintain some
force of compliance. “Though such legal justification may merely rationalize a decision made for
reasons of interest or power, the felt need of governments to advance a legal argument is a fact of
some consequence. The fact that their arguments are rationalizations does not mean they are
without influence.”228 While lip-service to international norms does not add up to respect for of
‘rule governed’ conduct, it demonstrates that states are aware that the illicit use of force is not
without costs.229 According to Louis Henkin, “even when a nation hypocritically invokes
international law as a cover for self-interested diplomacy…it is significant that it feels the need to
pay this homage to virtue.”230
Further compounding the difficulty of distinguishing true respect for international legal
norms from self-serving pursuit of power is the fact that for less powerful states, the two aims
may dictate the same course of conduct. For example, in Robert Kagan’s study of the growing
“variances in strategic culture” between the United States and Europe, Of Paradise and Power,
Kagan argues that Europe is becoming more transnationalist, withdrawing into a “self-contained
world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation.”231 In this ordered society,
European states achieve their international ends through a “nuanced and sophisticated”
combination of subtlety, negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion.232 They are quicker to appeal to
international law, international conventions, and international opinion to adjudicate disputes,
Kagan contends, than their American cousins, who often employ strategies of coercion.233 The
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difference, Kagan argues, is not due to a greater European respect for international law, but rather
the relative power of these nations, as commerce, international law, diplomacy, and persuasion
are the tools of weaker, smaller nations.234 As European military strength and hard power has
declined in the latter half of the 20th century, Europeans have worked to create a legalistic
international order where their military deficiencies matter less than their growing economic and
soft power.235 As the Europeans cannot conduct unilateral military operations, Kagan reasons,
they use their influence on UN Security Council as a substitute for the power they lack.236 In
working with the UN to prohibit unilateral uses of force, Kagan argues, the Europeans are merely
compensating for their weakness by preventing the US from doing what they cannot.237 From
Kagan’s perspective, the Europeans—while justifying their actions under transnationalism—are
driven by realist motives. In any anarchic world, the less powerful fear that they will be victims,
and seek order and stability that comes in a predictable, transparent international system regulated
by accepted rules.238 In defending these rules, the Europeans “secure the conditions of their own
continued existence” and gain leverage over stronger powers.239
In contrast, Kagan argues, powerful nations employ force and the threat of force to achieve
their goals, and often fear rules that constrain their options more than they do anarchy and
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violence.240 For example, when European states were powerful during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, they employed power-based approaches to international relations, and were ardent
nationalists and practitioners of realpolitik who often promoted their national ends through
military means.241 On the other side of the Atlantic, US statesmen—with much less ‘hard power’
to rely on, favored commerce and international law over brute force.242 According to Kagan, the
US’s “unipolar moment” came with collapse of the USSR. With the dissolution of the Soviet
counterweight, the US became free to protect its national interests through force, and did so in
places such as Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.243 Because it has the ability
to project military power to protect its interest, the US has developed a ‘problem-solving’
mentality, fixing problems through force or the threat of force, in effect, because it can.244
V: Reconciling Transnationalism and Realism in Practice
Examination of the theoretical basis of both transnationalism and realism suggests that there
is theoretical room for both, primarily because of uncertainty over the true motives that cause
states to choose either compliance or non-compliance with international law. On a practical level,
the two doctrines are not mutually exclusive because of fractures between different issue groups
in international relations. There appears to be little connection between international economic
relations and those relating to military-security issues; states are increasingly willing to comply
with international law on the former, while the authority of international law in the latter appears
to be on the decline. Nowhere is this split more evident than in the behavior of the United States,
who on one hand is the largest force behind the increasing legalism of international trade and
investment but has also posed a serious challenge to international legal rules on the use of force.

240

See generally KAGAN, supra note 231, at 11, 38.
Id. at 8-9.
242
Id. See also Glennon, supra note 196, at 30, noting that in the 19th century, the United Kingdom, with
the strongest navy in the world, opposed limitations on the use of force to execute naval blockades, limits
that were supported by the US and other weaker states.
243
KAGAN, supra note 231, at 26-27.
244
Id. at 32-33.
241

46

Transnationalists’ assertion that cooperation is the defining characteristic of international
relations seems borne out by developments in interstate economic relations over the course of the
last fifty years. Since the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1947, there has developed a
“general proclivity towards international law among powerful states” in regards to international
trade and finance.245 What started as a loose framework of regulatory instructions has since
developed into a highly ordered system for ordering the complex economic interactions for many
of the world’s economic powers. International organizations such as the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) evolved from “skeletal institutional arrangements” into broader and
stronger international regimes such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) that have
accelerated global economic growth and prosperity.246 Each of these institutions, while reducing
barriers to international trade, limiting the influence of national protectionism, and bolstering
global economic growth, has “provide[d] the jurisprudential infrastructure for peace.”247 In so
doing, organizations such as the WTO have developed “a logic and a life of their own,”248 slowly
imposing constraints on the economic policy options available to their member states.249
No single country has been a larger force behind legalization of international trade and
investment than the United States. Since the drafting of the Atlantic Charter in 1941, the US has
been a tireless advocate for international economic liberalization and the rule of law in governing

245

Krisch, supra note 153, at 383.
Barton & Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535 (1993), reprinted
in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (3rd ed., 1999). See generally John
O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 514-515
(2000), noting that “since 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has served as a
framework for several global negotiating ‘rounds’ in which signatories have agreed to substantial reciprocal
tariff reductions.” Under the GATT, average world tariffs have declined from approximately 40% in 1947
to less than 5% in the early 1990’s. Id .at 516. See also Chen, supra note 56, at 246, estimating that
economic growth associated with globalization during the 1980’s lifted 1.4 billion people out of absolute
poverty.
247
Id. at 229.
248
See generally SANDS, supra note 48, at xvii. See also Moshe Hirsch, Compliance with International
norms in the age of globalization: two theoretical perspectives, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 169 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004).
249
See generally McGinnis and Movesian, supra note 246, at 514-515. The WTO’s Ministerial Conference
and its General Council both have the authority to adopt binding interpretations of multilateral agreements
upon a three-fourths vote. See id. at 533.
246

47

those interactions. The US views free trade as the best method by which to “promote prosperity,
the rule of law, and liberty,”250 and it has grown to constitute the “heart of US engagement with
international law.”251 As the nation with the most overseas investment, the United States has
supported international free trade rules needed to create the stability and certainty that favors
American investors and protects their intellectual property rights.252 The US helped forge
multilateral institutions such as the WTO and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
and pushed for similar rules in other areas of the world, such as Central and South America.253
Most importantly, the US has willingly agreed to tight international regulatory controls on
international trade and investment in the context of the WTO and has accepted the authority of
international judicial mechanisms to resolve disputes within that framework.254
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While it has played a major role in developing the international economic order, the United
States has historically been skeptical of international constraints on its military and security
options, such as the use of force.255 Nowhere is that tension more evident than in the dispute over
the war in Iraq. Disputes over the international role in authorizing that conflict brought into
direct conflict transnationalists’ views on the moral obligation of international law with realists’
skepticism on legal constraints on the use of military force. Since then, accusations and counteraccusations of arrogance and naiveté have flown between the two sides, with US realists arguing
that pursuit of American interests will not be restrained by the irrelevant ‘debating society’ of the
United Nations, and transnationalists countering that US attempts to push its influence at the
expense of international organizations was a manifestation of its “unilateralism, arrogance, and
parochialism.”256
At the heart of the debate was compliance with one of the central tenets of modern
international law, the prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense as enshrined in articles
2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter.257 The framers of the Charter, working in the shadow of the
Second World War, believed that armed force was too dangerous to be allowed as a means for
political or territorial changes. In limiting the use of force to self-defense, the drafters sought to
bring within the realm of law “those ultimate political tensions and interests that had long been
deemed beyond control by law.”258 Since then, transnationalists assert, this core precept of
international law has been repeatedly affirmed in international law, and an understanding that war
is not acceptable has taken hold among the nations of the world.259 Transnationalists point to the
codification of these principles in a host of international treaties and judicial rulings—including
255
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the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions,260 The Rome Treaty of the International
Criminal Court,261 the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,262 and the
ICJ’s findings in Nicaragua v. US263 and The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons264—as evidence of states’ acceptance that international law imposes limits on their
recourse to force.
In contrast, this “most political of norms” against the use of force in international relations
has been the target of realists’ ire since its inception,265 who assert that the proliferation of
conflicts across the globe since the end of World War II demonstrates that states pay only lipservice to supposed legal restraints on the use of force. Many of the legal instruments purporting
to regulate the use of force, realists argue, are limited by either political considerations or the nonparticipation of powerful states.266 Decades of political maneuverings and self-serving
rationalizations, realists argue, have stretched the notion of self-defense beyond any reasonable
degree of enforceability; as stated by one observer, “what was supposed to be an exception not
much larger than a needle’s eye has become a loophole though which armies have passed.”267
The battle lines for a debate on the binding power of international law between the United
States and the international community were evident even before the September 11th attacks.
Many senior policymakers in the new Bush administration betrayed their skepticism of
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international law and their belief that international institutions were merely venues for smaller
nations to restrain the United States like “Gulliver among the Lilliputians.”268 For example,
during the 2000 Presidential campaign, future National Security Advisor and Secretary of State
Condaleeza Rice—an avowed realist—stated that the US should “proceed from the firm ground
of the national interest and not from the interest of an illusory international community.” Future
UN Ambassador John Bolton made similar comments in 1994, stating “it is a big mistake for us
to grant any validity to international law even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do
so —because, over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law really means
anything are those who want to constrict the United States.”269 Instead, US policymakers
emphasized the importance of state sovereignty as the ‘bedrock’ of the international system, and
evinced a willingness to be bound by international accords “only so far as they suit America,
which is prepared to conduct policy outside their constraints.”270
One of the primary expressions of this unwillingness to be bound could be seen in the
Administration’s adoption of the doctrine of pre-emption. In its 2002 national security strategy,
the US asserted a right to prevent its enemies from striking first; “[therefore] to forestall or
prevent…hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively.”271 Although legal scholars disagreed on whether this principle was a direct
challenge to article 51 or a rewording of the established doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense, the
move caused great controversy and caused many European allies to voice concern about the US
268
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assumption of a “conflict between the pursuit of national interests and commitment to the
interests of a far-from-illusory international community.”272
It was against this pre-existing tension that the showdown over Iraq in the UN Security
Council occurred. In justifying the need for armed force against Saddam’s regime, British and
American diplomats argued that Iraq was in ‘material breach’ of the conditions of the ceasefire
imposed by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 in 1991. Implicit in these arguments
by London and Washington was the belief that the Security Council should allow wide latitude to
states in order to fill the vacuum of their inability to act.273 In a speech before the UN General
Assembly, President George W. Bush challenged the UN to take action against Baghdad for
failing to disarm, and warned that he would act alone if UN failed to cooperate. “If the United
Nations doesn’t have the will or the courage to disarm Saddam Hussein,” the President stated,
“the United States will lead a Coalition to disarm him.”274
After eight weeks of debate, the UN Security Council responded to Bush’s challenge on
November 7, 2002 by unanimously adopting UNSCR 1441, finding Iraq in ‘material breach’ of
its obligations, and warning of “serious consequences” if it did not disarm.275 The resolution did
not explicitly approve or deny the use of force, however, and it soon became clear that both sides
of the debate interpreted it very differently. French, Chinese, and Russian diplomats said the
instrument did not authorize the use of force against Iraq, while US legal advisors argued that the
finding of a material breach made the unilateral use of force lawful.276 In the end, the UK sought
for several weeks to obtain a second resolution that clarified the situation by acknowledging Iraq
had not met its final opportunity to comply.277 However, in early March, 2003, France, China,
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and Russia announced they would block any subsequent resolution to authorize the use of force
against Saddam, and US and British troops started their offensive against Iraq two weeks later.278
Some three years later, realists and transnationalists still disagree on the legal and ideological
consequences of the war. There is a general consensus by both realists and transnationalists that
at a minimum the Iraq war constituted a severe setback for attempts to regulate the use of force
through international law,279 although realists argue that the failure of article 51 limitations was
long in the making, however. In erroneously assuming the sovereign equality of states, the UN
system failed to compensate for growing disparities in power between its members.280 American
unipolarity after the collapse of the Soviet Union eroded the council’s credibility and reduced it to
a forum by which other states attempted to limit the power of the US. 281 Without a balance of
power between member states, realists argued, the UN system was doomed to fail.282 In the
words of Michael Glennon, the “grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law” had
finally failed not due to a unilateral use of force in defiance of the Security Council, but rather as
a result of cumulative geopolitical forces too strong for the legalist structure of the UN to
withstand.283 Law cannot persist if the ground beneath it has changed, rebus sic stantibus,284 and
the UN system was the victim of a shift in world power towards US supremacy that was “simply
incompatible with the way [it] was meant to function.”285
Realist arguments that the UN Security Council had become merely a forum for states to
attempt to constrain the US are bolstered by statements from officials of those states who opposed
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the war.286 These statements make very clear that European legal arguments against the war were
based at least in part on realist principles, using the pretext of international compliance with the
UNSC as a check against the United States. Of these, the French were the most outspoken,
leaving no doubt that, in working to strengthen the role and authority of the UN Security Council,
Paris hoped to establish a European ‘counterweight’ to American power. Pierre Lellouche, a
senior foreign policy advisor to French President Chiraq, stated that France’s intention was to
establish a “multipolar world in which Europe is the counterweight to American political and
military power.”287 President Chirac himself was quoted as saying that “any community with
only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and provokes reactions,”288 while his former
Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, stated that “we cannot accept a…politically unipolar
world….that is why we are fighting for a multipolar one.”289 The German government, while
more muted, voiced similar intentions, with German former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt stating
his belief that “I do not feel obliged to other governments,” while also noting that Germany and
France “share a common interest in not delivering ourselves into the hegemony of our mighty
ally, the United States.”290
For their part, most transnationalists have regretfully concluded that the idea of the rule of
law in restraints on the use of force is waning.291 For example, Thomas Franck feared that the
pre-war decision-making crisis in the UN had doomed the potential for legal controls on the use
of force in the future. If the US recourse to force was merely an act of legitimate self-defense by
the Coalition, Franck reasoned, it would verify the strength of the article 2(4) system, the right of
self-defense, and the authority of the UNSC to authorize collective action under Chapter VII of
286
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the UN Charter.292 Instead, he argues, the US bypass of the UNSC was a product of American
fears of subordinating their sovereignty to others, particularly within a Security Council system
that gives other states power and influence far in excess of their actual status.293 While disputing
that states such as France and Germany who opposed the war were merely “power-jealous,”
Franck notes that an overwhelming majority of nations believed that either Iraq did not have a
significant quantity of weapons of mass destruction, or that they posed no credible threat to other
nations.294 The crux of matter, Franck argues, was not who was right or wrong in the factual
determinations, but how the decision to go to war was made. In this regard, unilateral action by
the US and UK brought down the mechanism for collective decision-making.295 “After a
decade’s romance with something approximating law-abiding state behavior,” Franck despairs,
“the law-based system is again being dismantled….in its place is American unilateralism free
from international law and multilateral obligations.”296
In contrast, other scholars, such as prominent German philosopher and social theorist Jürgen
Habermas, have noted that the victim of the war in Iraq is not that of international law, but the
acceptance of normative values within the international community, and particularly the moral
capital previously held by United States. America, he argues, in subverting the UN has lost the
persuasive power of the ideas on which its power had rested as much as its economic and military
strength.297 Other scholars such as Andreas Paulus have voiced some hope that the UN system is
not completely dead, as its prime repudiator, the United States, continues to work within its

292

Franck, supra note 58, at 607, 610.
Id. at 615.
294
Id. at 616.
295
See generally id.
296
Id. at 608. Franck continues: “It seems this is not an age when men act by principles simply because that
is what gentlemen ought to do. But living by power alone…is a nerve-wracking and costly business.” Id.
at 607. Strangely, in a later publication, Franck reverses himself, arguing that the international legal
system is viable but warning that criticisms of its impotency by realists are “a self-fulfilling prophecy.” See
Franck, supra note 3, at 90. “When a community loses faith in law’s power to restrain and channel
conduct, this perception propels the descent into anarchy….[these criticisms] should serve as a salubrious
stimulant for the rest of us. Among American legal scholars,…the majority impetus is, still to defend the
importance of international law, not least as advancing the national self-interest.” Id. at 106.
297
Paulus, supra note 198, at 692.
293

55

framework. Even while Operation Iraqi Freedom was raging, the US was litigating in the
International Court of Justice against Iran, and later negotiated for a UN resolution authorizing
the occupation of Iraq. While its system of restraint appears gravely wounded, Paulus insists, the
UN is unique in that it affords the legitimacy of action that the US alone cannot provide.298 While
power politics may interfere with its operation, he concludes, international law remains the “only
avenue towards a peaceful and just international order.”299
VI: Conclusion: A Hybrid International System?
In sum, there appears theoretical room for both transnationalism and realism in the scope of
international relations. This is due in part to a lack of clarity on the true motives behind state
behavior, allowing scholars, academics, and policymakers sufficient room to interpret states’
actions in accordance with their own theoretical paradigms. In a practical sense, however, the
ability of states to act simultaneously in both a realist and transnationalist fashion stems from
increasing divisions between daily diplomatic and economic transactions and more crucial, but
less frequent military-security issues. Henkin’s dictum that most states obey international law
much of the time does not preclude realist power politics or confirm the existence of a
transnational order; instead, it reflects states’ apparent acceptance that realpolitik is inevitable in a
limited number of fields while regulated, orderly international behavior is required in others.
Transnationalism is most successful in explaining the growth of global economic
interdependence and the willingness of many states to tie themselves into international
institutions or comply with customary norms of international behavior. Whether due to
conceptions of moral obligation, acceptance of customary bounds of state behavior, belief that
rules are legitimate, or the bureaucratic habit or inertia of continued compliance, increasing
numbers of states seem willing to be bound in their daily economic and commercial interactions
by systems of international norms, laws, and institutions. There is every indication that the long298
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term benefits offered by these arrangements, and increasing public expectations of the benefits of
those relations, may further institutionalize rule-based economic interactions in the coming years.
Transnationalism falls flat, however, in explaining why states behave in contradiction of
those norms. Even respectable states compete for power and security, employ violence and the
threat of violence to achieve their ends, disrespect or violate accepted international norms, and
pursue strategic ends such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons in direct violation of their treaty
obligations. It is in this military-security spectrum that realism is most predictive, defining the
international system as an anarchical forum in which individual states compete to secure and
maintain power and security against rivals and aggressors. While instances of selfish pursuit of
national interests may be less numerically frequent than decades of law-abiding daily interactions,
when supreme interests of national security clash with international law, most frequently it is the
law that bows.300
Nowhere is the separation between the transnationalist-economic and realist-security spheres
of international relations more evident than in the 2003 controversy over the use of force in Iraq.
In the months preceding the war, the United States and Britain—two nations with a long history
of promoting international law, particularly in the areas of trade and commerce—employed
military force without the explicit authorization of the UN Security Council and in so doing
challenged international restrictions on the use of force and potentially even the collectivesecurity framework of the United Nations. Meanwhile, the states that rallied to the defense of
those norms seemed more motivated by their geopolitical strategic ambitions then they did by a
genuine concern for the rule of law. Scholars and policymakers still debate whether these actions
were a killing blow to legal efforts to regulate international military-security issues, but despite
this major disruption, there is little evidence that the economic sphere suffered as a result.
Economic ties and relations between states on opposite sides of this conflict continued as before,
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trade arrangements were maintained, boundaries were honored and diplomatic protections
maintained. The firewalls between economics and security affairs, while not impenetrable, were
high enough in 2003 that even a major dispute over the role of law in restraining the use of force
did not disrupt them.
It is impossible to say whether, as transnationalists suggest, this hybrid system is just an
indication that the world is in a transitional stage between 19th century realpolitik and a future
Kantian international order. Certainly the next few years may be determinative of the role of
international law in security-military issues for decades to come—the policies of a new US
administration, the continuance of the ‘war on terror,’ a potential nuclear showdown with Iran or
North Korea—all hold historic opportunities to either reinforce or repudiate international norms
and institutions. In the meantime, however, it seems prudent to suggest that we can neither
completely adopt nor dismiss transnationalism or realism as explanative doctrines in international
relations. These two doctrines can be reconciled not because their tenets are complementary—
but instead because their two worlds seem to co-exist in the course of daily affairs.
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